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Bangladesh’s plan to fence parts of its 270-kilometer border with Myanmar reflects a fundamental shift in the security environment along the country’s southeastern frontier, where the Arakan Army now exercises de facto control over much of northern Rakhine State.
Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed recently announced the fencing plan as Bangladesh confronts growing concerns over cross-border crime, narcotics trafficking, landmines, civilian detentions and renewed refugee movements.
The decision follows the Arakan Army’s capture of Maungdaw on December 8, 2024, which effectively removed Myanmar’s central authorities from much of the border opposite Bangladesh.
For international observers, the fall of Maungdaw was another indication of the Myanmar military’s shrinking territorial control. For Bangladesh, it meant the disappearance of a functioning state authority across large sections of a highly sensitive frontier.
Arakan Army Becomes De Facto Border Authority
The Myanmar government now retains little meaningful presence in northern Rakhine State.
In its place, the Arakan Army, or AA, administers territory, regulates movement, collects taxes and performs many functions normally associated with a governing authority.
However, the AA is not a recognized sovereign government and is not formally bound by the bilateral agreements, diplomatic protocols and international obligations that traditionally regulate relations between states.
This creates a serious institutional gap for Bangladesh.
Dhaka can communicate with the AA through informal channels, intermediaries and international organizations, particularly during urgent border incidents. But such engagement remains reactive and lacks the predictability, accountability and reciprocal obligations associated with formal state-to-state relations.
Traditional Border Diplomacy Has Weakened
Bangladesh previously relied on official communication with Myanmar authorities to manage border disputes, security incidents and repatriation negotiations.
That framework has become increasingly ineffective in areas controlled by the Arakan Army.
The resulting asymmetry leaves Bangladesh dealing with an armed organization that exercises territorial authority but remains outside the formal diplomatic system.
Without recognized protocols, even routine disputes involving fishermen, civilians or territorial access can become difficult to resolve.
Detentions in the Naf River Raise Concern
Over the past year and a half, hundreds of Bangladeshi fishermen and Rohingya residents have reportedly been detained by the Arakan Army in the Naf River and nearby waters.
These incidents have highlighted the absence of agreed mechanisms governing arrests, maritime movement and jurisdiction in disputed or poorly defined waterways.
In a conventional bilateral relationship, such cases would normally be addressed through official border conferences, diplomatic notes or established security channels.
Under the present conditions, Bangladesh is often forced to negotiate through informal and temporary arrangements.
Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance Threaten Border Communities
Residents of Bandarban and other frontier areas continue to face risks from landmines and unexploded ordnance linked to fighting across the border.
Agricultural workers and villagers living near the boundary are particularly vulnerable as violence in Rakhine State spills toward Bangladeshi territory.
The danger has increased pressure on Dhaka to establish stronger physical barriers and monitoring systems along high-risk sections of the frontier.
Narcotics Trade Expands Along the Border
The Bangladesh-Myanmar border has also become a major route for methamphetamine and other illicit drugs.
Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies have reported large seizures, while trafficking networks continue to adapt their routes in response to enforcement operations.
Myanmar’s prolonged conflict and political fragmentation have allowed armed groups, criminal networks and local trafficking structures to operate within an expanding border economy.
A fence cannot eliminate the financial incentives driving the narcotics trade, but it may help authorities monitor movement and limit access through selected crossing points.
Fence Seen as a Risk-Management Tool
The proposed fence should not be understood as a complete solution to Bangladesh’s border challenges.
It cannot resolve maritime jurisdiction disputes in the Naf River, end narcotics trafficking or address the political conflict inside Rakhine State.
However, it may provide Bangladesh with a greater degree of unilateral control where formal coordination with the authority across the border has largely collapsed.
The measure also carries a domestic political function.
As public concern grows over smuggling, violence, irregular crossings and insecurity, the government is under pressure to demonstrate visible action.
A border fence signals that the state is responding, even if the underlying problems require broader political and regional solutions.
Message to Regional and International Actors
The fencing plan also communicates a wider political message.
Bangladesh has absorbed the humanitarian and security consequences of Myanmar’s internal instability for years, including the arrival of approximately 1.2 million Rohingya refugees.
Dhaka’s position is that it cannot continue carrying those costs indefinitely without stronger action from regional powers and the international community.
By reinforcing the border, Bangladesh is signaling that responsibility for Myanmar’s internal collapse and refugee crisis should not fall on one neighboring country alone.
Rohingya Repatriation Becomes More Complicated
Bangladesh has consistently maintained that repatriation is the long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis.
Previous repatriation agreements were negotiated with Myanmar’s central government.
However, much of the territory to which Rohingya refugees would return is now controlled by the Arakan Army.
This creates new uncertainty over who could guarantee the citizenship, security, freedom of movement and political status of returning Rohingya.
Human rights groups and Rohingya advocates have also accused the Arakan Army of serious abuses against Rohingya civilians, raising further questions about whether conditions under AA control would permit safe, voluntary and dignified return.
The change in territorial control may therefore delay repatriation even further.
New Displacement Adds Pressure on Bangladesh
Continuing conflict between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army has already forced additional Rohingya civilians toward Bangladesh.
A border fence may not fully prevent people fleeing violence from crossing, particularly during a major humanitarian emergency.
However, the plan reflects Bangladesh’s determination to assert that the Rohingya crisis must ultimately be resolved inside Myanmar.
Dhaka’s position remains that refugee flows are a consequence of persecution, conflict and political exclusion in Myanmar, not a crisis that Bangladesh can solve through indefinite accommodation.
Regional States Face Similar Challenges
Bangladesh is not the only country dealing with Myanmar’s fragmented border governance.
Thailand, India and China also share borders with territories where ethnic armed organizations exercise varying levels of control.
These countries have adopted different combinations of military deployments, informal engagement, trade arrangements and border restrictions.
None has developed a comprehensive solution because Myanmar’s wider conflict remains unresolved.
Bangladesh’s circumstances, however, are particularly severe because it must manage both a collapsed border-governance system and one of the world’s largest refugee populations.
A Barrier Cannot Replace Political Settlement
Ultimately, Bangladesh’s fencing plan is a risk-management measure rather than a durable solution.
It may help regulate movement, strengthen surveillance and provide greater control in selected areas.
But no physical barrier can replace functioning bilateral institutions, enforceable agreements or a political settlement inside Myanmar.
As long as northern Rakhine remains under contested or non-state authority, Bangladesh will continue facing uncertainty along its border.
The fence is therefore a visible sign of a deeper geopolitical transformation: Bangladesh is adapting to a frontier where the neighboring state no longer exercises effective control and where traditional diplomacy can no longer be relied upon.
Malaysian lawmaker calls for parliamentary explanation on plan to repatriate 5,000 Rohingya Former Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah has called on the government to provide Parliament with a detailed explanation […]
