Episode: KPN 04-09-2026

Bangladesh running out of options on Rohingya crisis as regional deadlock deepens

Nine years after the Rohingya refugee crisis escalated dramatically in 2017, Bangladesh remains burdened by a crisis it did not create and cannot resolve alone, while political and military changes inside Myanmar have made prospects for safe and sustainable repatriation even more uncertain.

The situation has changed significantly in Myanmar’s Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), now control most of the territory, including much of the frontier facing Bangladesh.

Myanmar’s military has lost control of most land crossings with Bangladesh, although the junta’s naval forces continue to retain strategic strength along the coast and around Sittwe.

For Bangladesh, this new reality has complicated an already difficult diplomatic and humanitarian challenge.

New power structure in Rakhine has not eased Rohingya suffering

The weakening of Myanmar’s military in Rakhine has not translated into greater security for the Rohingya.

Instead, a fresh wave of Rohingya has crossed into Bangladesh since renewed fighting intensified, with estimates cited in the article suggesting that at least 150,000 people have entered Bangladesh in recent years.

Many of the new arrivals say they fled violence, insecurity and persecution in areas now controlled by the AA.

Human rights organisations have also documented serious abuses.

Human Rights Watch has reported that AA fighters opened fire on Rohingya civilians in Hoyyar Siri village in Buthidaung Township in May 2024, killing scores of civilians, including children.

Rohingya activists have alleged that similar abuses have occurred elsewhere in northern Rakhine, while new arrivals continue to cross into Bangladesh.

These developments have raised a central question for Dhaka: even if Myanmar’s military government agrees to repatriation, who can actually guarantee security and rights on the ground?

Myanmar revives repatriation discussion

Myanmar has recently shown renewed interest in restarting the stalled repatriation process.

According to the article, Myanmar authorities have identified 308,797 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh as displaced residents of Myanmar.

The timing has prompted scepticism.

Myanmar had for years resisted creating conditions necessary for meaningful repatriation, and critics argue that the sudden change may be politically motivated.

One possible factor is the pending judgment in The Gambia v. Myanmar before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is examining allegations that Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention in its treatment of the Rohingya.

The article argues that Naypyidaw may be seeking to demonstrate apparent cooperation before the court process advances further.

Myanmar has used repatriation diplomacy in the past.

In November 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a repatriation arrangement shortly before a special session of the United Nations Human Rights Council on the Rohingya crisis.

Critics at the time argued that the agreement helped Myanmar portray the crisis as a bilateral issue rather than one requiring stronger international intervention.

Bangladesh disputes Myanmar refugee figures

Dhaka has rejected Myanmar’s latest figures as inaccurate, saying they fail to account for large numbers of children born to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.

This creates another politically sensitive issue.

Some advocates have argued that children born in Bangladesh should have access to Bangladeshi citizenship.

The article, however, argues that such an approach could weaken the Rohingya claim to Myanmar citizenship and potentially undermine prospects for future repatriation.

From this perspective, preserving the Rohingya identity as a people originating from Myanmar remains politically and legally important.

The issue highlights a broader dilemma: how to protect the rights of a generation born in exile without allowing Myanmar to permanently shift responsibility for the Rohingya population onto Bangladesh.

The limits of the ICJ process

The ICJ case remains one of the few formal international mechanisms seeking accountability for atrocities committed against the Rohingya.

Its symbolic and diplomatic significance is considerable.

But expectations about what the court can deliver should remain realistic.

The ICJ does not have its own enforcement mechanism.

If Myanmar fails to comply with a judgment, enforcement could ultimately depend on action by the United Nations Security Council, where geopolitical divisions could slow or block further measures.

For Rohingya refugees, this means that even a favourable ruling may not automatically lead to citizenship, justice or repatriation.

Still, a judgment against Myanmar could increase diplomatic pressure and further damage the international standing of its leadership.

Regional diplomacy remains tilted against Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s difficulty is compounded by the position of regional powers.

China and India have generally maintained close engagement with Myanmar and have been reluctant to pursue policies that could destabilise their strategic relationships with Naypyidaw.

Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN has also given it diplomatic space within the region.

Indonesia, which played an important role during the Rohingya refugee crisis of 1991–92, did not assume a similarly prominent role after the 2017 crisis.

Malaysia has been among the more vocal ASEAN members on Rohingya rights and rehabilitation, but broader regional pressure has remained limited.

As a result, Bangladesh has continued to carry a disproportionate share of the humanitarian, social and political burden.

Bangladesh still lacks a durable strategy

A high-level committee under Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has reportedly been formed to examine possible solutions.

But the deeper challenge remains unchanged.

Bangladesh can host refugees, negotiate with Myanmar, appeal to international courts and lobby regional powers, but none of these measures alone can create the conditions necessary for safe, voluntary and dignified return.

The crisis has increasingly become one that international actors seek to manage rather than resolve.

Humanitarian aid can sustain the refugee camps, but it cannot replace political rights.

Diplomatic statements can condemn abuses, but they cannot guarantee citizenship or physical security.

Repatriation agreements can be signed, but they are meaningless if the authorities controlling Rakhine State do not recognise or protect Rohingya rights.

Is there a way out?

The article argues that Bangladesh’s way forward will require a strategy that goes beyond bilateral talks with Myanmar.

Any durable approach will likely need coordinated international pressure, stronger regional diplomacy and direct engagement with the political realities now shaping Rakhine State.

It will also require keeping the Rohingya themselves at the centre of discussions on citizenship, security, return and long-term political status.

Nine years into the crisis, Bangladesh remains caught between humanitarian responsibility, regional indifference and the absence of an enforceable political settlement.

Unless those conditions change, the Rohingya crisis risks becoming not only protracted, but permanent.

About the author: Shudeepto Ariquzzaman is a research fellow at Neeti Gobeshona.

The views expressed in this analysis are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Kaladan Press Network.

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